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Abstract 
One of the most complex social policy issues that developing countries commonly face is the 
question of how they can protect the unemployed. However, the analysis of unemployment 
insurance (UI) in developing economies with large informal sectors is in its infancy, with few 
papers providing solid empirical evidence. This paper makes several contributions to the 
development literature: first, it applies Chetty’s 2008 landmark work on UI to a developing 
country (Chile) and shows that the moral hazard effects expected by policy makers, who 
designed the system are minimal, while liquidity effects were entirely neglected. By means of 
an RDD, it analyses the Chilean UI system using a large sample of administrative data, which 
allows for an extremely precise analysis of how the system is working, thus providing 
invaluable empirical lessons for other developing countries.   
Second, this paper shows that it is not enough merely to quantify an effect such as moral 
hazard, but to understand its causes and implications. An extended unemployment period 
stemming from moral hazard has extremely different welfare implications than one stemming 
from a liquidity effect and should therefore result in different policy recommendations.  
Third, our results also highlight that the Chilean UI system is regressive overall, as it protects 
workers with higher income levels and more stable jobs much more than it protects vulnerable 
workers, who are also much more likely to become unemployed.  
Fourth, this paper shows that it is essential that developing countries should take into account 
the specific labour market and macroeconomic context when designing social policies as the 
incentives embedded in such a policy may not be enough to compensate for the limitations 
that arise from the structure of a labour market. 
This research thus has implications for many developing countries, which may also be 
considering the implementation of some form of UI and/or the partial or complete replacement 
of existing severance pay legislation with continuous contributions to individual savings 
accounts, as recommended by the international development institutions. Furthermore, even 
high-income developing countries, such as Chile, cannot rely on unemployment insurance 
alone when it comes to protecting workers from the fallout of an economic crisis or rapid 
changes in the labour market that generate unemployment. Any UI system must also be 
linked to other social protection mechanisms to provide complimentary benefits to workers 
with precarious jobs. 
Keywords: Unemployment Insurance; Latin America; Social Policy in Developing 
Countries; Welfare Systems; Moral Hazard vs Liquidity; Inequality 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most complex social policy issues that developing countries commonly face is the 
question of how they can protect workers, who become unemployed. This is a vital question 
in developing countries, which rarely have instituted fully fledged welfare states.1 In the 
broader context of social protection systems, workers must be protected from unemployment 
produced by globalisation, technological advances and even global pandemics such as the 
Covid19 outbreak. In fact, since the beginning of the Corona Depression, countries all over 
the world have used UI systems to pay subsidies to furloughed workers (Caram & Pupo, 
2020; Otero, 2020). 
However, protecting unemployed workers in developing countries is not an easy task. As 
Sehnbruch et al. (2019) explain in detail, less developed countries generally do not have the 
institutional capability to distinguish between workers who are genuinely unemployed or 
working in the informal sector with low earnings. In developed countries, governments 
monitor the availability of workers to accept a new job as well their job search effort. 
Developing countries, however, do not have the institutional capacity to do this. Therefore, a 
concern widely expressed in the literature on unemployment insurance is that workers could 
receive insurance benefits without really looking for a new job. This phenomenon is referred 
to as “moral hazard” in the literature. 
As a result, much expert attention in developing countries, focuses on whether 
unemployment insurance systems can be designed in a way that limits moral hazard. After 
2006, however, landmark papers by Chetty & Looney (2006) and Chetty (2008) recognised 
the economic and social value of unemployment insurance. Their research shows that the 
potential welfare gains can be particularly significant in developing countries, where many 
workers live in households close to the subsistence line, and are therefore particularly 
vulnerable to economic shocks, which can lead to costly expenditure reductions, such as 
taking children out of full-time education and putting them to work. Preventing this type of 
expenditure reduction is referred to as “consumption smoothing” in the literature. 
This paper applies and tests Chetty’s 2008 paper on optimal UI using administrative data 
from a UI system in a developing country. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first 
to do so. It should therefore provide researchers of social policy in developing countries with 
valuable insights on the role of UI in the context of constructing welfare states. 
There is now a consensus in the policy making literature that some form of two-tiered UI 
provision in developing countries would be desirable. This should feature (1) a mandatory 
individual savings account (ISA) funded by contributions from individual workers and/or their 
employers that would not be redistributive and (2) a risk sharing funding mechanism that is 
redistributive and financed through taxes, which steps in when savings accumulated in the 
ISA run out.2 The idea put forward by this literature is that such a structure would protect 
workers who become unemployed without incurring significant moral hazard in developing 
countries in which the combination of large informal sectors (where workers could 
 
1 As Berg and Salerno (2008) have argued, governments in developing countries previously dealt with economic 
shocks principally by subsidising jobs or generating emergency employment programmes. 
2 Most recently, such as design is recommended by Duval & Loungani (2019) from the IMF. The World Bank 
has made a similar recommendationError! Bookmark not defined. (Ribe et al., 2010).   
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hypothetically work while receiving UI benefits) and limited institutional capacity to monitor 
the behaviour of the unemployed make the establishment of traditional risk sharing, 
redistributive UI systems unfeasible  
However, most of this literature is based on theoretical policy recommendations and not on 
empirical evidence. As Schmieder & von Wachter (2016: 577) point out: “the analysis of the 
role of UI in developing economies with large informal sectors is in its infancy.” Studying this 
subject is particularly important given the “sizable interest by many emerging market 
countries in developing UI systems.” In fact, several developing countries have already 
instituted such two-tiered systems as described by Duval & Loungani (2019). They include 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Jordan, and Mauritius. Unfortunately, with the notable exception of 
Brazil3 and Chile4, little empirical research has been undertaken on these systems that 
analyse how they are functioning in practice. In this context and considering Chile’s role as a 
Latin American pioneer of social insurance systems based on individual savings accounts, 
the country’s UI system is widely regarded as a model for other countries in the region as 
well as for other developing countries as it is assumed to have achieved a near optimal design 
that would lower the risk of moral hazard, while also providing an adequate degree of social 
protection for unemployed workers (ILO, 2012 and Vodopivec, 2013). However, so far, this 
conclusion is not based on reliable empirical evidence, especially as the Chilean 
unemployment insurance system has only recently reached a sufficient degree of institutional 
maturity to allow for the analysis of whether these claims about its optimal design are indeed 
justified. 
This paper therefore takes advantage of the fact that – rather unusually – the Chilean 
government provides access to administrative data from the country’s UI system, which 
allows for a very precise analysis of how the system is functioning. This system is based on 
a combination of individual unemployment insurance savings accounts and a so-called 
‘solidarity fund’, designed to provide minimum levels of coverage to workers who have not 
been able to accumulate enough savings in their individual accounts to cover a limited period 
of unemployment. Both workers and employers contribute to these funds, and the 
government provides the solidarity fund with some additional fiscal support.  
Using a regression discontinuity design (RDD) following Lee and Lemieux 2010, this paper 
explores whether the system has indeed minimised moral hazard, and, if so, to what extent. 
To access the solidarity fund, a worker has to have made at least 12 monthly contributions 
to his or her individual savings account (ISA). This study exploits this discontinuity to study 
differences in the length of the unemployment period following an employment relationship 
 
3 Brazil has an UI system similar to the two-tiered system described by Duval & Loungani (2019) although it 
consists of two separate institutions that are not integrated into a single system: The ISA mechanism in Brazil 
consists of the Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Serviço (FGTS) and the risk sharing UI system is the separate 
Fondo de Amparo al Trabajador (FAT). For an analysis of these systems, see Hijzen (2011), who uses panel 
survey data and Gerard & Naritomi (2019). 
4 Hartley et al., 2011 and Huneeus, Leiva and Micco (2012) analyse the Chilean UI system with administrative 
data from before 2010 when the system was still being rolled out and had not yet fully matured; and Nagler 
(2015) analyses the system with survey data. Sehnbruch et al. (2018) is the only study that uses recent 
administrative data from a period when the UI system had already matured and shows that the system has 
achieved an extremely low level of coverage among unemployed workers.  
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that was concluded. Given the nature of the UI assignment, an RDD is a common tool used 
for quantifying the impact of these programmes on behavioural outcomes.5 
In addition, it analyses the liquidity effects of the UI system, which has been ignored by the 
literature.6 Previous studies, such as Hartley et al. (2011) and Huneeus et al. (2012) highlight 
the problem of self-selection among workers who use the different components of the UI and 
those who do not. But they do not discuss the fact that these effects are minimal, nor do they 
examine whether the behaviour of the unemployed may be motivated by a liquidity effect.7 
This paper analyses the longitudinal administrative data produced by the UI system, to show 
that such a liquidity effect does exist, but only among a very limited group of workers, who 
are first time users of the system.  
This paper therefore contributes to the existing literature in several ways: First, it undertakes 
an analysis of the Chilean UI system using a large sample of administrative data, which allows 
for a much more precise analysis of how the system is working, providing useful empirical 
lessons for other developing countries. Second, the RDD used in this paper shows that the 
effect of moral hazard on unemployment duration is in fact minimal, while a liquidity effect – 
neglected by other studies – does exist. Third, and most importantly, this paper contributes 
to public policy research by showing that it is not enough merely to quantify an effect (as most 
economists do), but to understand its causes and implications. An extended unemployment 
period stemming from moral hazard has extremely different welfare implications than one 
stemming from a liquidity effect and should therefore result in different policy 
recommendations. In addition, our results also show that the Chilean UI system is regressive 
overall, as it protects workers with higher income levels and more stable jobs much more 
than it protects vulnerable workers, who are also much more likely to become unemployed.  
It is therefore crucial that policy debates on the optimal design of UI systems in developing 
countries should take into account the specific labour market and macroeconomic context of 
an individual country when designing social policies as the incentives embedded in a social 
policy may not be enough to compensate for the limitations that arise from the structure of a 
labour market (Arza, 2008). Sehnbruch et al. (2019) show that for reasons of political 
economy and expediency, the Chilean UI was designed with the specific intention of 
preventing moral hazard. This paper builds on this work and shows that the moral hazard 
effect displayed by workers is so minimal as to be negligible, while the precariousness of jobs 
in the Chilean labour market combined with the benefit conditions imposed by the system 
result in the most vulnerable workers being protected the least by the system. 
Overall, this research thus has implications beyond the Chilean case, especially for other 
developing countries, which may also be considering the implementation of some form of UI. 
It is also relevant to policy debates, which are considering the partial or complete replacement 
of existing severance pay legislation with continuous contributions to individual savings 
 
5 See for example Dieterle et al. (2018); Lalive (2007); Schmieder & von Wachter (2016). 
6 See for example Huneeus, Leiva and Micco, 2012; Vodopivec, 2013. Notable exceptions are Hijzen, 2011; 
and Gerard and Naritomi, 2019. 
7  These papers also examined this question, but used data from 2002-2009, a period during which the system 
was still being implemented and gradually rolled out through the incorporation of new contracts. This distorts 
their results because a greater proportion of workers contributing to the system had short-term employment 
contracts. 
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accounts, as recommended by Heckman and Pages (2000) or Holzmann and Vodopivec 
(2012). Finally, it shows that even high-income developing countries, such as Chile, cannot 
rely on unemployment insurance alone when it comes to protecting workers from the fallout 
of an economic crisis or rapid changes in the labour market that generate unemployment. 
Any UI system must also be linked to other social protection mechanisms such as universal 
basic incomes, earned income tax credits and emergency employment programmes to 
provide complimentary benefits to workers with precarious jobs. 
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 discusses the literature relevant to this paper. 
Section 3 explains the particularities of the Chilean unemployment insurance system and 
presents a descriptive analysis of how the system works in practice. Section 4 then presents 
the analytical model and the data used, Section 5 analyses its results and shows that the 
moral hazard effect on workers who benefit from the system is so minimal as to be irrelevant 
in practice. By contrast, the liquidity effect of the UI system on low income workers is much 
more significant, a fact that was previously ignored by the literature. Section 6 concludes by 
discussing the implications of this research for other developing countries.  
 
2. Theoretical Approaches to Unemployment Insurance 
In developing countries, economic crises can lead to sharper increases in unemployment 
than in developed countries, as even salaried workers are often hired on a precarious 
contractual basis, such as fixed-term contracts or subcontracting and can thus be made 
redundant quickly (Sehnbruch et al., 2020). Also, there are few labour market institutions, 
such as unions, which can negotiate wage reductions instead of widespread redundancies 
(Colombo et al., 2019). 
Increased unemployment can therefore push more workers into the overcrowded and 
unproductive informal sector (Udall and Sinclair, 1982), which increases the risk of falling 
below the poverty line in countries which rarely have fully fledged welfare states and are still 
debating the merits of targeting resources versus establishing universal welfare benefits 
(Riesco, 2009).8 Workers also lack access to other insurance systems, credit markets, or 
personal wealth, particularly affecting young workers who have just entered the labour market 
(Cho & Newhouse, 2013). Thus, as Chetty & Looney (2006) argue, the potential welfare gains 
from UI are greater in emerging markets and developing economies than in advanced 
economies. As a result, governments in developing countries are increasingly looking at 
establishing UI systems to contain the social cost of economic downturns (Schmieder and 
von Wachter, 2016). However, as Sehnbruch et al. (2018) show, since there are few empirical 
studies of how unemployment insurance works in lower income countries, where 
governments are strongly influenced by empirical evidence from developed countries. 
In the latter, the theoretical literature on UI systems has historically focused on the optimal 
design of UI (Hopenhayn & Nicolini, 1997) by examining the relationship between the 
contribution requirements to UI systems, the duration of unemployment benefits and job 
search behaviour through stylized models. Recent papers have extended their models to 
 
8 Kingdon and Knight (2004) show that this is not the case for South Africa, where unemployed workers do not 
enter the informal labour market due to barriers such as credit constraint or perceived insecurity. 
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include biased beliefs about employment prospects (see, e.g., Spinnewijn, 2015) or by 
adapting them to include dynamic profiles (see e.g.,  Landais, 2015; Kolsrud et al., 2018).9 
The goal of these “optimal designs” is twofold: to provide liquidity and avoid adverse 
incentives when searching for a new job (Fredriksson & Holmlund, 2006). However, initially, 
the main concern in the literature has always focused on the latter. Hopenhayn and Nicolini 
(1997 and 2009), for example, argue that unemployment benefits should incorporate a 
decreasing replacement ratio, together with a future wage tax that increases with the duration 
of unemployment. Feldstein & Altman (2007) even went as far as to suggest that individual 
savings accounts should be established for workers so that they can save for the possibility 
of unemployment, with the government extending potential loans against future earnings (at 
a premium) when individual accounts are depleted.10 This more radical solution thus 
proposes to eliminate any social risk sharing associated with traditional unemployment 
insurance systems so as to avoid the potential of moral hazard.11  
These arguments are based on research which shows a spike in the hazard rate (i.e., in job 
search effort) around the time when social benefits run out in countries such as Austria or 
Germany (Card et al., 2007; Schmieder et al., 2012). However, attributing this spike only to 
moral hazard ignores the existence of other issues, such as liquidity constraints related to the 
fact that better unemployment benefits reduce the pressure to accept the first job offer 
received, which in some cases can explain up to 60% of the increase in unemployment 
durations (Chetty, 2008; Landais, 2015; Landais & Spinnewijn, 2019) Both the ‘moral hazard 
effect’ and the ‘liquidity effect’ result in a longer non-contribution period, but their welfare 
implications differ greatly. 
While most of the literature on unemployment insurance focuses on contingency policies 
(conditions and benefits) and their implications for moral hazard, a more recent strand of 
literature has examined consumption responses to income changes and has highlighted the 
sensitivity of consumption to liquidity. This literature focuses on the positive welfare effects 
of unemployment insurance: providing liquidity and limiting the need for precautionary 
savings (Jappelli & Pistaferri, 2010). Gérard & Naritomi (2019) show that Brazilian workers 
eligible for both unemployment insurance and severance pay increase their consumption at 
layoff by 35% and suffer a 17% drop after they stop receiving benefits. Similar patterns have 
been found in the United States (Ganong & Noel, 2019) and Sweden (Landais & Spinnewijn, 
2019). By focusing on consumption patterns, this line of research shows the importance of 
liquidity constraints as well as looking at the timing of unemployment benefits in addition to 
benefit conditions and levels. 
However, the public policy debate on ISA based systems in developing countries either 
predated this more recent literature or simply did not consider the arguments put forward by 
Chetty (2008) on liquidity constraints.12 Most of the literature that was influential in developing 
countries even begins with the basic argument that there is a genuine role for State provision 
of UI as adverse selection criteria make it impossible for the private sector to provide such 
 
9 For an excellent overview of this literature, see Schmieder and von Wachter (2016). 
10 See, for example, van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) on Jordan. 
11 See also Orszag and Snower (2002) 
12 Note that these findings are replicated by Card et al. (2007) for Austria and Basten et al. (2016) for Norway. 
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insurance.13 Second, this literature reiterates how labour markets in developing countries are 
different from those in advanced economies, as they are characterised by both high levels of 
informal employment and low levels of institutional capacity, thus generating a higher 
potential risk of moral hazard.14 These experts therefore suggest that self-insurance schemes 
based on Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs), complemented with some state funding (as in 
the Chilean UI system) would work best in developing countries. Blanchard and Tirole (2008), 
on the other hand, warn that the use of individual savings accounts can also result in 
problems such as firms not internalising the cost of layoffs, resulting in excessive job 
destruction. Ferrer and Riddell (2011)) further suggest that ISAs could contribute to promoting 
the informal sector as employers attempt to avoid the cost of contributing to the UI system. 
Four conclusions can be drawn from the literature on UI in developing countries: first, a 
theoretical concern about moral hazard outweighs welfare issues, in particular the potentially 
positive impact of liquidity effects as specified by Chetty (2008). Second, as Schmieder & von 
Wachter (2016) have pointed out, there is a dearth of empirical literature on how UI systems 
really function in developing countries – as opposed to theoretical discussions of how they 
could function. In particular, studies analysing administrative data from UI systems are 
scarce.15 Third, to the best of our knowledge, there are no empirical studies of the 
complementarity between UI systems and the characteristics of the labour markets in which 
they operate. This means that optimal insurance systems can be designed in theory that then 
fail to cover the unemployed as the conditions they impose on potential beneficiaries are not 
compatible with employment conditions in precarious labour markets (Robalino, 2014; 
Sehnbruch et al., 2019). Fourth, despite warnings from some authors, such as Blanchard and 
Tirole (2008), there appears to be a consensus in the literature that systems which combine 
ISAs with some form of additional government support would work best in developing 
countries. Overall, the existing literature on developing countries significantly underestimates 
the role of UI as a social policy as well as its potential to address liquidity constraints resulting 
from loss of employment. 
In the case of the Chilean UI,  Sehnbruch et al. (2018) chronicle the policy debate that 
preceded the design and establishment of the UI system and was entirely focused on the 
subject of moral hazard, completely ignoring the possibility of liquidity arguments. 
Consequently, the Chilean UI system is based on ISAs, staggered benefit payments, and a 
minimal risk sharing component. So far, the existing literature has concluded that the Chilean 
system provides reasonable protection and limited distortions (Berstein, 2010), even though 
some studies argue that it has not eliminated the issue of moral hazard (Reyes-Hartley et al., 
2011 and Huneeus et al., 2012). However, these papers have not at all considered the 
implications of liquidity effects, as they continue to attribute all changes in unemployment 
durations to moral hazard. This paper shows that the study of the Chilean UI system requires 
a more nuanced approach, particularly regarding the use made of its solidarity component, 
as well as its effects on job search efforts. If the Chilean UI is to be touted as a “model” for 
 
13 The most recent illustration of this argument is Duval and Loungani (2019), but Feldstein and Altman (2007) 
and Vodopivec (2013) also made a similar argument. 
14 See Feldstein and Altman, (2007); Ferrer and Riddell, (2011); Vodopivec, (2013); Duval and Loungani, (2019). 
15 Exceptions to this rule are Sehnbruch et al. (2018 and Gerard & Naritomi (2019).  
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other developing countries, it is crucial to understand how this system works in practice, not 
just on paper. 
 
3. Background to the Chilean case and how the insurance system works 
The Chilean UI covers all dependent workers between the ages of 18 and 65, who work in 
the private sector and who have been unemployed for at least 30 days. This means it 
excludes the self-employed (or informal workers), domestic service workers (who have an 
individual savings account mechanism) and the public sector.16 
Since its institution in October 2002, all new employment contracts have been contributing to 
the UI system.17 The amount each worker contributes to the system depends on their type of 
contract. Workers with open-ended contracts contribute 0.6% of their taxable income to their 
own ISA, while employers contribute 1.6% to the same account and 0.8% to the solidarity 
fund, resulting in a total contribution of 3% per worker. Workers with fixed-term contracts, on 
the other hand, do not contribute to the system at all, but their employers contribute 2.8% of 
their taxable income to their ISA and 0.2% to the solidarity fund, also resulting in a 3% 
contribution per worker. These contributions are summarised in Table 1.  
Table 1: Contributions to the UI system by type of contract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Summarized from law bill that creates the UI system (number 19728). 
 
In addition, the government contributes a yearly lump sum to the solidarity fund of 
approximately US$1.5m. Both the contributions to ISAs and the solidarity fund are invested 
 
16 According to official data from Chile’s National Institute of Statistics, in 2018, 27.8% of workers in Chile are 
informal workers, 10.9% are employers or formally self-employed, 2% are formal domestic service employees 
and 10.5% work in the public sector. This means that only 48.8% of the total labour force is covered by this UI 
system.  
17 Only a minimal number of contracts voluntarily became part of the system. 
 
Open ended contracts 
 Individual 
Account 
Solidarity Fund Total 
Worker 0.6 0.0 0.6 
Employer 1.6 0.8 2.4 
Total 2.2 0.8 3.0 
Fixed term contracts 
 Individual 
Account 
Solidarity Fund Total 
Worker 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Employer 2.8 0.2 3.0 
Total 2.8 0.2 3.0 
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in money market instruments to generate a minimum return over time. Lastly, if a worker does 
not use their ISA at retirement age, all funds are transferred to their individual pension fund.18  
To withdraw money from the UI system, workers must have contributed to it for at least 12 
months over the course of the last 24 months in the case of workers with open ended 
contracts (6 months in the case of fixed term workers). Only the last three of these 
contributions must be continuous and from the same employer. Workers only have access to 
the solidarity fund if they lose their job as a result of a redundancy clause, not if they 
voluntarily resign from employment. 
The amount and number of payments that a worker can ultimately withdraw from the UI 
system thus depends on the type of contract held before becoming unemployed and on the 
amount of savings accumulated in his or her ISA. Replacement rates then begin at 70% of 
the prior wage, decreasing by 5% each month until reaching a minimum of 30%. If a worker 
has sufficient savings, the number of withdrawals that can be made is theoretically unlimited, 
although after the seventh month of unemployment the replacement rate is maintained 
constant at 30 per cent.  
If the funds accumulated in a worker's individual savings account are insufficient to fund a 
period of unemployment and the worker was made redundant, s/he has the right to obtain 
additional benefits from the system's solidarity fund. The amount and number of payments 
made by this fund provide payments for up to five months that are equal to what a worker 
would obtain from his or her ISA, subject to legal minimum and maximum amounts (For 
details, see Sehnbruch et al. (2019)). Unemployed workers thus only receive payments from 
the solidarity fund if their own savings have been used up. It is this inclusion of a Solidarity 
Fund that distinguishes the Chilean UI system from other such systems in Latin America and 
that led to its description as a “model” for other developing countries. 
3.1. Data used in this study 
This paper uses the administrative database of the Chilean UI system, which is managed by 
the Superintendencia de Pensiones, the institution that also supervises Chile’s pension 
system. This database gathers monthly information on income, type of contract, economic 
sector, among other characteristics for all formal workers in Chile. It also provides information 
on the requests made to the UI system by these workers, and on the benefits they received. 
The database is updated every year and can be downloaded online. 19 
The Superintendencia de Pensiones has made available smaller samples of the complete UI 
database, specifically 3%, 5%, and 12% random samples drawn from the complete 
administrative dataset. This paper combines the 3% and 5% samples to work with an 8% 
sample of workers.20 The sample starts in 2002 with the creation of the UI system and runs 
 
18 All contributions are limited to a maximum of 11 years. If a worker stays in the same job for more than 11 
years, contributions to the UI system cease as it is assumed that 11 years allow for a sufficient accumulation of 
funds to cover the eventuality of unemployment (Beyer, 2000; Acevedo et al., 2006). 
19 The database can be downloaded at www.spensiones.cl/apps/bdp/index.php. 
20 To create a larger sample, we merged the two sample databases between which there was no overlap of 
cases. We did not, however, add the 12% sample to our database as this made it unwieldy and exceed the 
capacity of our computers. 
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until March 2018. In its raw form, the database includes just over 800,000 workers with 50 
million monthly contributions and almost 650,000 benefit claims made. 
The database includes monthly information on each employment relationship. It also includes 
information on benefit claims. The raw data comes in 6 different files, which include 
contribution histories, benefit claims, UI payments, and UI rejections. We merged these 
databases to be able to undertake this analysis. This process involves harmonising each of 
the files to properly merge individuals across them in the correct time period. The final result 
is a dataset that includes monthly contributions for each worker, with information on whether 
they made a benefit claim after their employment ended, how many payments they received 
and from which source. For our analysis, we focus on the last month of employment, so we 
work with one observation per employment relationship. 
Note that this paper uses the terms "unemployment" and “unemployed” loosely when 
referring to workers, who stop contributing to this UI system. In fact, the nature of our 
administrative dataset does not allow us to discern whether workers are genuinely 
unemployed while not contributing to the system (i.e. not working and looking for a new job), 
or whether they are inactive or working informally. They could also be working in other sectors 
not covered by the UI system (e.g. domestic service, armed forces, or the public sector). For 
the purposes of linguistic simplicity, we nevertheless refer to workers not contributing to the 
UI system as “unemployed”. 
To account for the problem of including people working outside the UI context (i.e., private 
formal workers), we focus on workers who have an unemployment duration of at most 24 
months. These are workers that reappear in the data (or stopped working in the last two years 
of data) thus minimizing the issue of working outside of the formal private job market. To 
further reinforce the idea that we are focusing on workers that go back to work formally, the 
appendix replicates our results for unemployment durations of at most 12, 6, and 3 months, 
with similar results. 
3.2. Benefits paid by the UISA 
The four main factors that determine benefits received from the UISA are the reason for 
unemployment, the duration of the previous job and its wage level, and the contractual status 
the worker had prior to becoming unemployed (open ended or fixed term contracts). These 
are therefore the conditions that have to be taken into account when analysing the empirical 
evidence that relates to the functioning of the Chilean unemployment insurance system.21 
Table 2 compares the employment conditions of all employed workers with those of 
unemployed workers (or of the jobs they held prior to becoming unemployed), who constitute 
10.5% of the sample. As we can see, the jobs held by workers who become unemployed are 
significantly more precarious than those of employed workers. For example, overall, 70% of 
workers contributing to the insurance system have open-ended contracts, while 30% have 
fixed-term contracts. Among workers who become unemployed, by contrast, only 26% had 
open-ended contracts. Furthermore, the average income levels of workers who became 
unemployed are significantly below those of other workers (602 vs 1243 USD). The same 
goes for the average duration of the job prior to becoming unemployed and the proportion of 
 
21 A more detailed description of how the Chilean UI works (including its linkages to the services of municipal 
employment services and vocational training) can be found in Sehnbruch et al. (2019). 
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workers who contributed for less than three months to the UISA prior to becoming 
unemployed. Overall, Table 2 shows that, on average, the employment conditions of workers, 
who become unemployed are significantly more precarious than those of workers who are 
employed.  
Of the total number of employment relationships in January 2018, only 0.6% made an 
insurance claim. Here, it is important to note that the average employment conditions of this 
group of workers are significantly better that those of terminated workers in general. Table 2 
shows that 60% of these workers had open-ended contracts, and their average income was 
USD 612. However, the duration of the jobs they held prior to becoming unemployed is also 
very low. It is this low level of job duration that explains why so few workers claim benefits 
from the insurance. Although the condition that workers must have contributed for a minimum 
of 6 or 12 months (fixed or open-ended contracts respectively) is not particularly stringent in 
the comparative context of UI systems (Asenjo & Pignatti, 2019), the short duration of 
employment in Chile means that very few workers are able to comply with this condition 
before becoming unemployed, especially as the unemployed are more likely to have held 
precarious jobs to begin with. 
  
Table 2: Characteristics of Employed and Unemployed workers (Raw data - 
January 2018) 
 
Type of 
Contract % 
Income 
(USD) 
Average Age Duration 
% Duration of 
less than 3 
months 
All Employment 
Relationships 
Open-ended 69.8% 1460.9 39.3 41.1 5.7% 
Fixed term 30.2% 738.7 35.8 8.5 42.8% 
Total 100% 1243.3 38.2 31.3 16.9% 
Terminated 
Employment 
Relationships 
(10.5%) 
Open-ended 26.4% 816.3 37.1 22.4 20.6% 
Fixed term 73.6% 525.4 34.0 3.8 69.5% 
Total 100% 602.2 34.8 8.7 56.6% 
Made a UI 
request (0.6%) 
Open-ended 60.4% 669.5 37.3 35.3 7.2% 
Fixed term 39.6% 525.4 37.8 9.0 28.7% 
Total 100% 612.5 37.5 24.9 15.7% 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using administrative data from the Chilean 
Unemployment insurance system. January 2018 exchange rate (602.3 CLP). Because of 
data management constraints, this table uses the 3% sample only. 
  
As discussed above, to request funds from the UISA system, workers have to satisfy certain 
conditions, which depend on the type of contract they had prior to becoming unemployed, 
the number of contributions made to the system, and on the cause of their unemployment 
(redundancy or other). To access their ISAs, workers who had open-ended contracts require 
a minimum of 12 contributions (consecutive or non-consecutive), while workers with fixed-
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term contracts require at least 6 contributions.22 On the other hand, workers can access the 
solidarity fund only if their ISA funds are not enough to cover their scheduled payment. In 
addition, they must have made at least 12 contributions during the last 24 months, with the 
last 3 being from the same employment relationship. 
The payment scheme follows a staggered design, with ISA payments starting at 70% of the 
average income, followed by 55%, 45%, 40%, 35% and 30% from the sixth month until month 
thirteen. Solidarity fund payments vary depending on the type of contract: Open-ended 
contracts follow the same structure as with the ISA until month 5, while fixed-term contracts 
get 3 months of payments with a replacement rate of 50%, 40%, and 35%. In case of high 
unemployment,23 each worker can get up to two additional payments with a replacement rate 
of 30% each.  
Overall, take-up rates among the unemployed of the UISA are quite low as illustrated in Table 
3. Given the low use of the UI system and, in particular, of the solidarity fund, the population 
of interest to our estimation is very small.24 In our sample (2010-2018), we see that 20.3% of 
all terminated employment relationships make a request to the UI system, but only 4.8% 
satisfy the requirements for using the solidarity fund (11.7% of open-ended and 2.2% of fixed 
term contracts). Only half of the workers with the right to use it end up doing so (2.4% in total 
– 6.6% of open-ended and 0.8% of fixed-term workers). The effects we find, however, have 
to be put into context when extrapolating them to the labour market: even if we find a longer 
unemployment period, we are talking about less than 5% of all terminated employment 
relationships among formal workers. 
Table 3 shows that the use of the UI is not only low, but highly regressive. Among open-
ended contracts in the fifth quintile, 38% of all terminated relationships make a request to the 
UI, whereas only 16.7% of workers at the first quintile do so. This gap is even larger for fixed-
term workers at 30% and 4.2% for the fifth and first quintile respectively. We also see large 
differences when looking at access and use of the solidarity fund. Among workers in the fifth 
quintile of the earnings distribution, 15.2% and 5.4% have the right to use the solidarity fund 
(open-ended and fixed term, respectively), and 7% and 2% use it. On the other hand, 4.2% 
and 0.2% of the first quintile of terminated workers have the right to use the solidarity fund, 
while usage rates are 2.8% and 0.1% for open-ended and fixed-term workers, respectively. 
Access and use of the solidarity component are thus highly skewed towards higher earning 
jobs, leaving the most vulnerable workers with lower incomes and who had fixed-term 
contracts (and are therefore more likely to become unemployed) wholly unprotected. 
Evidently, such a system exacerbates labour market inequalities rather than redressing them.  
 
 
22 In both cases, these contributions have to be accumulated since the last use that a worker made of the UI 
system. Workers can request funds from the UISA or SF only once every three years. 
23 Specifically, an unemployment rate one percentage point above the 4-year average. 
24 It must be noted here that there is no clarity as to why the take up level of the Chilean UISA system is so low. 
The Chilean Ministry of Labour once attempted to survey users of the system to find out more about take up 
rates, but the response rate to the survey was so low that its results were not published (Sehnbruch et al., 
2019). 
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Table 3: Use of the UI by income quintile (% of all terminated employment 
relationships) 
 
Open-ended contract 
Makes a request 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
No 83.4% 70.7% 65.2% 61.9% 62.2% 68.7% 
Yes 16.6% 29.3% 34.8% 38.1% 37.8% 31.3% 
Right to FCS 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
No 95.8% 90.9% 87.3% 82.8% 85.1% 88.4% 
Yes 4.2% 9.1% 12.7% 17.2% 14.9% 11.7% 
Uses FCS 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
No 97.2% 94.4% 92.3% 90.0% 93.4% 93.4% 
Yes 2.8% 5.6% 7.7% 10.0% 6.7% 6.6% 
Fixed term contract 
Makes a request 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
No 95.9% 90.9% 84.0% 78.2% 70.2% 83.8% 
Yes 4.1% 9.2% 16.0% 21.8% 29.8% 16.2% 
Right to FCS 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
No 99.8% 99.2% 98.3% 96.9% 94.7% 97.8% 
Yes 0.2% 0.8% 1.8% 3.1% 5.3% 2.2% 
Uses FCS 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
No 99.9% 99.7% 99.4% 98.8% 98.1% 99.2% 
Yes 0.1% 0.3% 0.6% 1.2% 1.9% 0.8% 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using administrative data from the Chilean Unemployment 
insurance system. Quintiles are calculated separately for each group (i.e., open-ended, fixed term, 
total). 
 
A simplistic approach to studying the effect of the solidarity fund would be to compare those 
who use it to those who do not. However, such a comparison would suffer from serious 
endogeneity issues due to selection bias. As Figure 1 shows, the hazard rate for unemployed 
workers varies significantly depending on how they use the system.25 Workers who use the 
SF start their non-contribution period with particularly low hazard rates, while workers with 
the right to use the SF but choose not to use it have much higher hazard rates. The two tend 
to converge after benefits run out. The same can be said about workers who only use their 
ISAs or who do not use the UISA at all. These groups display different behaviours during 
 
25 The hazard rate is defined as the probability of ending the non-contribution period in time t, conditional on the 
fact that it has not finished by time t-1. 
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their non-contribution periods and comparing them directly would result in a biased analysis. 
The following section therefore presents our identification strategy.  
 
Figure 1: Hazard rate by usage of the UI system
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using administrative data from the Chilean Unemployment 
insurance system. 
 
 
4. Methodology and Empirical Framework 
To account for the selection issue discussed in the previous section, a sharp regression 
discontinuity design is used. This exploits the fact that workers need at least 12 contributions 
in the last 24 months for them to have the right to request benefits from the solidarity fund. 
Using this cut-off, we compare workers’ rights below and above this threshold to estimate the 
effect of having the right to access the solidarity fund. Under certain assumptions, the 
difference between these two groups will equal the effect of having the right to use the 
solidarity fund (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008; Lee & Lemieux, 2010). 
Throughout the paper, we follow common practice in RDD by first examining the relevant 
discontinuities visually, and then proceeding to estimate standard regression discontinuity 
using the following model: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖 + 𝑓(𝑟𝑖, 𝐶𝑖) + 𝑒𝑖. 
Where 𝑌𝑖 is the unemployment duration in months, 𝐷𝑖 is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the worker has the right to use the solidarity fund, and 𝑓(𝑟𝑖, 𝐶𝑖) is a function of the running 
variable 𝑟𝑖, in this case the number of contributions in the last 24 months for the previous 
employment, and the eligibility rule 𝐶𝑖, whether the worker has 12 or more contributions (i.e., 
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𝐶𝑖 = 1(𝑟𝑖 ≥ 12)). For estimation, 𝑓(𝑟𝑖, 𝐶𝑖) is modelled as a linear function with different slopes 
on both sides of the slope. Bandwidth for estimation is set at 4 months. Different bandwidths 
were tested in the appendix, with results showing no important differences. 
In this context, treated workers are the unemployed workers who have made at least 12 
contributions in the last 24 months, and thus have the right to use the solidarity fund, while 
untreated workers are the unemployed workers with 11 or fewer contributions in the same 
period, and that do not have the right to use the solidarity fund.  
We can see how this assignment rule works in Figure 2. The first graph shows the share of 
unemployed workers who make an UISA request relative to the number of contributions since 
their last request. In the case of fixed-term workers, requests can only be made after making 
six contributions to the UISA, while open-ended contract workers must contribute for at least 
12 months before being able to claim benefits. Between 15 and 20% of unemployed fixed-
term workers claim benefits from the UISA, while the figure increases to between 20 and 35% 
of the unemployed among open-ended contracts.  
Graphs 2 and 3 in Figure 2 follow the rule used to access the solidarity fund: number of 
contributions in the last 24 months. Workers have the right to request the solidarity fund after 
12 contributions, which is exactly the cut-off we see in the figure. 
 
Figure 2: Take-up rates of the UISA and the solidarity fund (SF) 
 
Note: Panel 1 includes the share of all terminated relationships that made a UI request as function of 
the number of contributions since the last request (i.e., the rule to access the UI). Panel 2 and 3 focus 
on the use of the solidarity fund, and therefore show shares of workers that made a request, as a 
function of the number of contributions in the last 24 months (i.e., the rule to access the SF). Panel 2 
includes the share of workers with the right to use the SF and panel 3 the share of workers that 
accepts the SF. Contributions in the last 24 months do not necessarily have to have been continuous. 
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An alternative approach would be to estimate this model using a fuzzy RDD. We would be 
focusing on the compliers, that is, on those workers who have the right to use the solidarity 
fund and then decide to use it. If that were the case, our treatment would be ‘using the SF’ 
rather than ‘having the right to use it’. The problem with such an approach lies in the extremely 
low take-up rates of the solidarity fund. As table 3 shows, only 2.4% of all terminated 
employment relationships result in the use of the SF, making the estimates from fuzzy RDD 
unreasonably large. For that reason, we opted for using only use sharp RDD in our analysis. 
Our analysis centres on all terminated employment relationships after 2010 as the database 
is highly biased prior to this date: when the UISA system was implemented in 2002, all newly 
created employment relationships were automatically affiliated to the system, while workers 
with an active contract could opt in. This resulted in a database highly biased towards shorter 
employment relationships as only a negligible number of workers voluntarily joined the 
system. It is not until 2009 that the database matured and stabilized, producing estimates 
comparable to statistics derived from official employment surveys. In addition, a reform in 
2009 changed the requirements needed to access the UI system. Focusing on the following 
year thus provides a sample of workers representative of the formal labour force, who all 
shared a common set of rules to access the UI. Our RDD analysis uses the same data set 
for all estimations. We look at all terminated relationships between January 2010 and January 
2018. 
The estimates stemming from the RDD will report the additional unemployment duration 
resulting from having the right to use the solidarity fund. Whether these estimates are 
beneficial or harmful depend on its cause. Long unemployment durations coming from moral 
hazard are completely different to those caused by a liquidity effect. To test the cause of this 
effect, we follow Chetty (2008) and compare high-earning workers to those with low earnings 
who are therefore more likely to be liquidity constrained. The comparison between the two 
will give us an indication of the relative importance of the two causes, as low income workers 
are expected to suffer both from moral hazard and liquidity effects, while high income workers 
will only suffer from the former. 
 
5. Results 
In this section we discuss the effect of having the right to use the solidarity fund, by type of 
contract as well as for the total sample. We start by showing our results graphically and 
proceed to show the regression tables. All graphs include the confidence interval at 95%. 
Lastly, and in order to study the relative importance of the moral hazard and liquidity effects, 
we proceed to repeat the analysis for each quintile of the earnings distribution. Table 4 
summarizes all results in regression form. 
We look at workers close to the threshold for the right to use the solidarity fund, and compare 
those who are right below with those who are right above the threshold. Because our 
treatment is the right to use the solidarity fund rather than its actual use, we interpret these 
results as the lower bound of the effect of actually using it.  
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Before discussing our RDD results, it is important to put these in context. As discussed 
before, only 31.5% of workers who had open-ended contracts and became unemployed end 
up making a request to the UISA system, while 16.2% of fixed-term contracts do so. 11.8% 
of open-ended contracts and 2.3% of fixed-term contracts had a job that lasted long enough 
for them to be able to access the solidarity fund. The requirements to use the solidarity fund 
thus end up being highly demanding, as they allow only a very small proportion of workers to 
use it. It is only because we are using a very large sample of administrative data that it is 
possible for our analysis to focus on such a small group of workers and still produce 
statistically meaningful and accurate results. 
Table 4 below analyses all terminated employment relationships that contributed to the UI 
system between 2010 and 2018 as only these workers would have the right to claim 
insurance benefits, and these are the workers who constitute the sample for our subsequent 
RDD. However, as our initial RDD results showed that there was no moral hazard effect, we 
dug deeper into the data and examined the behaviour of first-time entrants into the system. 
Our RDD thus makes a distinction between established workers and first-time entrants. The 
latter are defined as first-time contributors to the system and (if they make a request) can be 
first-time users of the UI system. This does not necessarily mean that we are looking at a 
worker’s first job. As the UI only includes formal wage-earners from the private sector, 
entrants could include former public workers, self-employed or domestic service workers, 
employees, who had stable jobs and are only just entering the system for the first time or 
even former employers.  
As Table 4 shows, the employment conditions of first-time entrants are slightly more 
precarious than those of established workers in that they hold a higher proportion of fixed-
term contracts. However, entrants with open-ended contracts earn higher incomes than 
established workers and the duration of their contribution to the system is significantly longer. 
This suggests that entrants with open-ended contracts include workers with previous 
employment experience, who only became part of the UI system when they changed jobs. 
On the other hand, entrants with fixed-term contracts are younger, have significantly shorter 
job durations, and have lower incomes, more in line with what one would expect from first-
time jobs.  
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of all terminated employment relationships, 2010 
- 2018   
 
All workers First time entrants Established workers 
  (100%) (9.1%) (90.9%) 
 
Open-
ended 
Fixed-term 
Open-
ended 
Fixed-term 
Open-
ended 
Fixed-term 
  (27.9%) (72.1%) (20.8%) (79.2%) (27.3%) (72.7%) 
Income (USD) 617.1 381.3 755.0 301.8 606.9 390.0 
Age 35.5 32.9 37.3 25.1 35.3 33.7 
Gender (male) 75.3% 79.8% 73.4% 70.2% 75.4% 80.8% 
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Duration (contribution) 18.2 12.1 14.4 3.2 18.4 13.0 
Duration (< 3 months) 25.9% 69.1% 18.6% 75.5% 26.4% 68.4% 
Duration (Non - contribution) 6.1 5.2 7.5 7.5 6.0 4.9 
Observations 344,643 889,442 25,698 97,869 370,341 987,311 
 
Source: Authors’own calculations using administrative data from the Chilean Unemployment 
insurance system. January 2018 exchange rate (602.3 CLP). 
 
Before discussing our results, Table 5 compares workers right below the cutoff of 12 months 
with those right above it. This comparison serves as a cross check for our RDD (a similar 
result is shown in figures A1 to A4 in the appendix). Workers above the cutoff have slightly 
higher income (which, as shown in Figure A, can be explained by the upwards trend for 
income). The remaining variables show very small differences between both groups.  
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics below and above the cutoff 
 
Below the cutoff Above the cutoff 
 
Open-
ended 
Fixed-term Total 
Open-
ended 
Fixed-term Total 
  26.5% 73.5% 100% 32.2% 67.8% 100% 
Income (USD) 610.9 322.7 399.1 645.4 336.5 436.0 
Age 36.1 31.1 32.4 36.3 31.4 33.0 
Gender (male) 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 
Duration (contribution) 17.5 7.8 10.4 17.6 8.7 11.6 
Duration (< 3 months) 26.6% 81.8% 67.2% 24.2% 74.8% 58.5% 
Duration (Non - 
contribution) 
10.5 10.4 10.4 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Observations 19,803 54,869 74,672 14,305 30,084 44,389 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using administrative data from the Chilean 
Unemployment insurance system. We include all workers with unemployment duration of 
10 and 11 months (below the cutoff) and 12 and 13 (above the cutoff). January 2018 
exchange rate (602.3 CLP). 
 
5.1. Average effect of having the right to use the solidarity fund 
Figure 3 shows the duration of unemployment versus our running variable, the number of 
contributions in the last 24 months for all terminated employment relationships. The first panel 
shows how workers who had open-ended contracts use the UI system, while the second 
panel illustrates how workers who had fixed-term contracts use it. We find small to no effects 
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among the overall sample, as shown graphically in Figure 3 as well as in Table 6, which 
shows a small difference, of 0.13 months (4 days) for fixed-term workers and 0.18 months 
(5.4 days) for open-ended workers. Effects, although statistically significant, are small in 
terms of their economic significance. 
 
Figure 3: Duration of unemployment by number of contributions in the last 24 
months 
 
 
Overall, we must therefore conclude that the evidence of moral hazard in the Chilean UISA 
is negligible, especially considering that, as discussed above, only 4.9% of the workers in our 
sample satisfy the requirements make a claim for benefits from the solidarity fund. However, 
as we are working with a large sample of administrative data, we are nevertheless able to dig 
deeper into the data while maintaining the precision of our estimates. We can therefore 
examine whether this conclusion holds for all workers in the system, or whether there are 
exceptions to this rule. To this end, we examine a particular subgroup of our sample: the first-
time entrants to the UISA system, i.e. workers who appear in our database for the first time, 
as defined above.  
As Figure 4 shows, when we look at entrants, we see larger differences in how entrants and 
non-entrants use the UISA. Table 6 shows that these effects are equivalent to 1.7 months 
(51 days) for open-ended contracts, and of 1.4 months (42.7 days) for fixed-term contracts. 
The average effect for entrants is of 1.56 months, or 46.8 days. First-time entrants show a 
significantly higher effect of having the right to use the solidarity fund, but as Figure 2 shows, 
these effects diminish importantly once we consider the following employment relationships. 
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Figure 4: Duration of unemployment by number of contributions in the last 24 
months (entrants only) 
 
 
Table 6: Effect of having a claim to the solidarity fund 
  All Contracts Open ended Fixed term 
 
All workers Entrants Non-entrants All workers Entrants Non-entrants All workers Entrants Non-entrants 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
RD Estimate 0.107** 1.497*** 0.0712 0.122 1.468*** 0.0296 0.103** 1.487*** 0.0823* 
 
(0.0442) (0.333) (0.0444) (0.111) (0.521) (0.114) (0.0472) (0.428) (0.0474) 
            
Obs. 1,357,652 123,567 1,234,085 370,341 25,698 344,643 987,311 97,869 889,442 
Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions use 4 months for bandwidth. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Although these effects are important in terms of unemployment duration, the reference group 
is so small as to make the overall impact on the UI system almost negligible. First-time users 
of the UI system represent less than 10% of the overall sample, and those among them who 
contribute for the required 12 months represent 14.2% of these workers, i.e. no more than 
1.4% of the workers, who become unemployed and use the UI system.26 It is within this small 
group that we find some effects. Given that these are lower bounds of the effect of using the 
 
26 55.8% of open-ended contracts and 3.5% of fixed term contracts. 
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solidarity fund, the fact that only around half of the workers with the right to use it end up 
doing so suggests that a large aggregate effect is unlikely. 
The fact that the quality of employment for entrants differs by type of contract suggests that 
these effects stem from different sources. Open-ended contracts are often associated with 
better employment conditions in general, while fixed-term contracts have worse than average 
employment conditions. By using wages as a proxy of net assets, and therefore of liquidity 
constraints, we expect the liquidity effect to matter more for entrants with fixed-term contracts 
than for entrants with open-ended contracts. The following section develops this idea by 
studying the effects at the extremes of the wage distribution. 
5.2. Heterogeneous effects: Effects by average wage quintile. 
The degree of liquidity constraint can be measured using household net assets (Chetty, 
2008), as households with no (or negative) net assets will have little liquidity to respond to 
unemployment shocks. Unfortunately, the Chilean UI database includes no information on 
savings, wealth, or debt. To provide a measure of the extent of liquidity constrains of each 
worker, we follow Centeno and Novo (2009) and split the sample into income quintiles for 
each type of contract.27 This idea follows from the evidence that wages are the main driver of 
differences between poor and rich households and a good proxy of net assets (Ziliak, 2003). 
Indeed, incipient studies show how wealth in Chile is highly concentrated at the top, with the 
bottom 60% holding almost no wealth at all (Sanroman & Santos, 2017). By comparing 
workers in the lower and higher earnings quintiles, we expect to compare households with 
different wealth levels. Households with limited (or no) wealth are expected to experience 
both a liquidity and a moral hazard effect, while high wealth households should only 
experience the latter (Chetty, 2008; Chetty & Looney, 2006).  
Table 7 extends the descriptive statistics of Table 5 by splitting the sample into wage quintiles. 
By construction, wages for the fifth quintile are higher, but the gaps are large. Average wages 
for the highest quintile are roughly 10 times larger than for the first quintile. The fifth quintile 
is also comprised by older workers (gaps of 5 to 10 years), by a higher share of men (14 to 
20 percentage points) and a higher share of workers with higher education (3 to 20 
percentage points higher). The fact that entrants with open-ended contracts have better jobs 
than non-entrants holds across all quintiles, as is the case for fixed-term entrants, with lower 
incomes than non-entrants for all quintiles.  
  
 
27 The authors use income quartiles, but given the large number of observations, we divide the sample into 
quintiles, thus providing a slightly finer decomposition of the liquidity constraint distribution. 
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics by entrant status, type of contract, and by quintile 
      
Income 
(USD) 
Age 
Gender (% 
men) 
Duration 
(contribution) 
Duration (< 3 
months) 
Duration (Non-
contribution) 
Non-entrants 
Open 
ended 
Q1 171.0 33.6 54.7% 14.7 53.4% 6.9 
Q2 311.1 34.6 59.6% 17.4 27.8% 6.4 
Q3 415.3 34.7 61.2% 18.7 21.3% 6.5 
Q4 612.8 35.4 67.7% 20.2 16.2% 6.3 
Q5 1524.3 38.4 73.5% 21.2 13.5% 6.7 
Fixed term 
Q1 78.6 31.8 60.8% 10.5 94.8% 5.7 
Q2 197.4 32.7 62.6% 11.4 81.4% 5.5 
Q3 302.8 33.5 65.9% 12.8 64.8% 5.1 
Q4 431.7 34.1 68.1% 13.9 56.8% 5.1 
Q5 939.7 36.6 80.6% 16.5 44.2% 4.4 
Entrants 
Open 
ended 
Q1 181.5 33.2 50.3% 10.1 38.8% 8.3 
Q2 317.4 35.7 54.4% 13.2 21.6% 7.9 
Q3 422.7 35.4 56.0% 13.5 15.8% 8.7 
Q4 687.1 38.7 60.0% 16.6 10.6% 8.5 
Q5 2167.3 43.3 67.7% 18.8 6.2% 9.7 
Fixed term 
Q1 66.5 23.2 44.2% 1.6 96.1% 8.8 
Q2 162.9 24.0 44.1% 2.5 85.7% 8.5 
Q3 250.7 24.9 48.2% 3.2 75.5% 7.9 
Q4 353.4 25.4 51.9% 3.9 65.8% 7.6 
Q5 676.2 28.0 58.2% 4.9 54.2% 7.6 
All workers 
Open 
ended 
Q1 172.3 33.6 54.3% 14.3 52.3% 7.0 
Q2 311.5 34.7 59.2% 17.1 27.1% 6.6 
Q3 416.0 34.7 60.9% 18.4 21.2% 6.6 
Q4 616.1 35.5 67.3% 20.0 16.0% 6.4 
Q5 1569.8 38.7 73.0% 21.0 12.9% 6.9 
Fixed term 
Q1 77.1 30.8 58.8% 9.4 94.9% 6.1 
Q2 193.2 31.5 60.3% 10.3 82.2% 5.9 
Q3 297.0 32.6 64.1% 11.8 66.0% 5.4 
Q4 423.4 33.3 66.7% 12.9 57.7% 5.3 
Q5 915.8 36.1 79.1% 15.9 44.9% 4.6 
 
Source: Authors’own calculations using administrative data from the Chilean Unemployment 
insurance system. January 2018 exchange rate (602.3 CLP). 
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Table 8 estimates the effect of having the right to use the solidarity fund separately across 
earning groups. We look at the separate effect for quintiles 1 and 2 (bottom 40%), quintiles 3 
and 4, and quintile 5 (top 20%). We see that general results hold. Effects for entrants are 
much larger than effects for the complete sample. However, we see that the effects for 
entrants are driven by the extremes of the distribution, with only the extremes of the 
distribution showing statistically significant effects. 
As discussed above, we expect lower income quintiles to be more liquidity constrained than 
top quintiles. If moral hazard effects are homogeneous across the wage distribution, then 
lower quintiles having a higher effect would indicate the presence of a liquidity effect. When 
looking at entrants with open-ended contracts, the top 20% increases their noncontribution 
period in 3.4 months, compared with an increase of 1.7 for the bottom 40%. On the other 
hand, entrants with fixed-term contracts show effects at the bottom of the distribution that are 
larger than effects at the top: 2.81 additional months versus 2.46 months. Results therefore 
suggest the presence of a liquidity effect only among entrants with fixed-term contracts. 
 
Table 8: Effect of having the right to use the solidarity fund by average income 
quintile 
All Workers 
  Open ended Fixed term 
  Bottom 40% 40 to 80% Top 20% Bottom 40% 40 to 80% Top 20% 
RD  -0.000816 0.238 0.453 0.0104 0.140* 0.226* 
 
(0.149) (0.185) (0.386) (0.0719) (0.0735) (0.120) 
      
Obs. 148,158 148,115 74,068 395,248 394,616 197,447 
Entrants 
  Open ended Fixed term 
  Bottom 40% 40 to 80% Top 20% Bottom 40% 40 to 80% Top 20% 
RD  1.707** 0.596 3.412** 2.813* 0.0352 2.455*** 
 
(0.827) (0.754) (1.458) (1.437) (0.645) (0.623) 
      
Obs. 10,307 10,252 5,139 39,157 39,147 19,565 
Non-entrants 
  Open ended Fixed term 
  Bottom 40% 40 to 80% Top 20% Bottom 40% 40 to 80% Top 20% 
RD  -0.0770 0.234 -0.0211 0.00664 0.105 0.221* 
 
(0.151) (0.191) (0.399) (0.0710) (0.0743) (0.124) 
      
Obs. 137,960 137,755 68,928 355,778 355,826 177,838 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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This result supports the idea that the liquidity effect is relatively more important for fixed-term 
workers. Given a relatively higher wealth stock, workers in the fifth quintile are expected to 
experience very little liquidity constraints, and therefore their effect is (at least to a great 
extent) driven by a moral hazard effect. Adapting Chetty (2008), the difference between this 
effect and the effect for the bottom 40% can be interpreted as being driven by a liquidity 
effect. The fact that it is the most precarious jobs that have the strongest effect points to the 
fact that the liquidity effect trumps the moral hazard effect in that group. 
When looking at open-ended contracts, the opposite result holds. Entrants have better jobs 
than the average open-ended worker, and among entrants the strongest effect appears to be 
among workers with the highest wages. As the largest effect is at the top of the distribution, 
the moral hazard effect appears to matter more than (or at least as much as) the liquidity 
effect in this group. However, it is important to remember that these results can only be 
observed among 2.9% of the total number of unemployed workers, which corresponds to 
unemployed first-time entrants with fixed-terms contracts, who fall into the bottom 40% of 
their earnings distribution. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In the introduction, we asked how unemployed workers in developing countries can be 
protected by unemployment insurance in the broader context of social protection systems. 
Based on this question, this paper first analysed the Chilean UI system using administrative 
data to show that its coverage is extremely low in terms of the workers who become 
unemployed and subsequently claim benefits from the system (Table1 and 3). Only 11.8 
percent of workers who had open-ended contracts and became unemployed had the right to 
make a claim from the insurance system’s solidarity fund. Of these workers, only 6.7 percent 
actually made a claim. Among the most precarious workers, i.e. those with fixed-term 
contracts, this proportion drops to 2.3 percent and 0.9 percent respectively.  
As discussed in the introduction to this paper, this limited coverage is due to the high level of 
job rotation in the Chilean labour market rather than to overly stringent conditions embedded 
in the insurance system that require workers to contribute to the insurance for a particular 
length of time before being able to come claim benefits. 
Second, among the unemployed who do receive benefits, we observe no moral hazard in the 
use of these benefits overall: neither among workers with open-ended or fixed term contracts, 
nor among workers who have access to the solidarity fund. This contradicts findings from 
previous studies (Huneeus et al., 2012; Reyes-Hartley et al., 2011), which is possibly 
because the latter used a period of data during which the unemployment insurance system 
was not yet mature. Using an RDD, we found some degree of moral hazard, but only by 
digging deeper into the data and isolating first-time users (entrants) of the insurance system 
with fixed-term contracts. For this group, having the right to use the solidarity fund can 
increase unemployment durations by 1.56 months on average. However, by this time we are 
looking at such a small proportion of the unemployed that our overall conclusion is not only 
that the moral hazard effect of this system is minimal, but that it also affects only 2.9% of our 
sample, so as to be negligible overall.   
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Third, to explore the relative importance of the liquidity and moral hazard effects in our results, 
we estimate our results by wage quintile, which was not done by previous studies. 
Unfortunately, the low coverage of the system means that it provides very little liquidity to 
unemployed workers in general. Our results show that average effects are driven by the 
bottom 40% and the fifth quintile, with little to no changes in the middle of the wage 
distribution. However, the effect size changes by type of contract. Open-ended entrants show 
a larger effect among high wage-earners (3.3 versus 2.97 additional months), while fixed-
term workers show a much larger effect among low wage-earners (6.5 versus 2.4 months). 
We suggest that these results point towards a higher relative importance of the liquidity effect 
for fixed-term workers.  
Fourth, this paper makes the more general point that while, theoretically, it could be argued 
that the design of the unemployment insurance system fulfilled its purpose by avoiding moral 
hazard, it seems more relevant to argue that the system overall is not working because it 
does not protect the unemployed, i.e. the cost of avoiding moral hazard comes at the cost of 
providing such minimal benefits that the unemployed are discouraged from claiming benefits. 
Experts and policymakers recommending that a system similar to the Chilean model be 
replicated in other developing countries should be aware of these limitations. 
In particular, it must be highlighted that the Chilean UI system exacerbates prevailing 
inequalities in the labour market: first of all, the likelihood that workers with precarious jobs 
become unemployed is much higher than the probability of workers with stable jobs and 
higher incomes becoming unemployed. Second, among the unemployed the most precarious 
workers are the least protected, while workers who had relatively good jobs are more likely 
to be able to claim benefits from the system. Finally, the solidarity fund embedded in the 
system, which is was originally supposed to redistribute funds towards lower income workers, 
does exactly the opposite. Workers in low quality jobs in Chile therefore face a double 
inequality: On the one hand, they are more likely to become unemployed, and on the other, 
if they become unemployed, they are less likely to receive benefits. 
In addition, the Chilean UI does not include any provisions for redistribution linked to the 
situation of individual workers. Unlike UI systems in developed countries, which pay out 
higher replacement rates depending on wage levels, how many children or dependents a 
worker has, whether s/he is the main earner in the family or the worker’s age (Schmieder, 
von Wachter and Bender, 2012), the Chilean system includes no such mechanism. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways; first, it shows that a theoretical 
concern about moral hazard and optimal insurance design in the theoretical literature 
developed in a context of industrialised countries with formal labour markets may play out 
very differently in developing countries. Second, the liquidity analysis undertaken in this paper 
shows that this aspect must be considered when designing insurance systems in developing 
countries. Third, this paper contributes to the empirical literature on how unemployment 
insurance systems function in developing countries, and therefore hopes to inform theoretical 
discussions, which at the moment are rarely driven by empirical results. In particular, its use 
of administrative data allows us to undertake a much more nuanced analysis of how the 
Chilean UI is functioning in practice. Further research, however, is also required to study the 
effects of unemployment on the reemployment wages of workers in Chile.  
III Working Paper 54                        Sehnbruch, Carranza and Contreras 
 
28 
 
 
Overall, our paper leads to the conclusion that optimal UI systems can be designed that look 
good in theory but then fail to cover the unemployed as the conditions they impose on 
potential beneficiaries are not compatible with employment conditions in precarious labour 
markets (Robalino, 2014; Sehnbruch et al., 2019). The consensus that can be distilled from 
the existing literature, which recommends UI systems for developing countries based on 
individual savings accounts combined with a solidarity component, end up significantly 
curtailing the role of UI as a social policy as well as its potential to address liquidity constraints 
and inequalities resulting from loss of employment.  
In our view, there also remains a strong role for other forms of social protection that have 
traditionally been used at times of economic crisis or to protect the most vulnerable in 
developing countries. Whether these guarantee income (e.g. conditional cash transfer 
programmes, earned income tax credits or universal basic incomes) or employment 
(emergency employment programmes or employment guarantees) would depend on local 
contexts.28 Most importantly, however, such policies must take into account the particularities 
of individual countries and consider that theoretical incentives built into an insurance system 
that looks optimal on paper may not be enough to countervail the limitations arising from 
structural characteristics of local labour markets.  
  
 
28 See Ravallion (2019) for a discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of income versus 
employment guarantees. 
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Appendix 
Robustness checks 
To check the robustness of these results, we study a series of specification tests to verify if 
the core assumptions of the RDD hold (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). All results are estimated 
for the entrants’ subsample. 
 
1. Looking for possible jumps in the value of other covariates at the cutoff. 
The assignment rule should have an impact on other variables, as they are not affected by 
the treatment. We test this hypothesis for four different variables: average income, age, 
having complete high school, and living in the Metropolitan Region of Chile. All results are 
estimated separately by type of contract and are shown in figures A1 to A4. 
Figure A1: RDD for average income. 
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Figure A2: RDD for age. 
 
Figure A3: RDD for having competed high school. 
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Figure A4:  RDD for living in the Metropolitan region 
 
Figures A1 to A4 show no discontinuities at the cutoff point. Slight differences can be seen 
for income and age, however these differences are not statistically significant. 
 
2. Testing for possible discontinuities in the conditional density of the forcing 
variable. 
RDD can suffer from strategic behaviour if individuals are able to manipulate the forcing 
variable. In this case, strategic behaviour would arise if workers deliberately waited to have 
12 contributions before losing their jobs in order to have the right to use the solidarity fund. 
This would show as an unusually low share of workers with 11 months of employment, as all 
of them would wait one additional month. If that were the case, our analysis would be violating 
the non-discontinuity assumption. 
In order to test this, we plot the conditional density of the duration of the previous employment, 
which is shown in figure 
Visual inspection of figure A5 shows that the conditional density for employment duration if 
fairly continuous. There appears to be a small jump right after the 12 months cutoff. 
However, this jump is small (0.4 percentage points in both cases), and it is not unique to 
that particular point. 
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Figure A5: Conditional density of the duration of employment. 
 
3. Looking for discontinuities at other values of the forcing variable 
 
The RDD assumes that there are no other jumps over the distribution of the forcing variable. 
In other words, there should be a zero effect where we expect the effect to be zero. Imbens 
and Lemieux (2008) suggests checking the median point at both sides of the cutoff, however, 
the median at the left is of 2 months, which leaves no space to test for discontinuities at the 
left. We estimate this test only for fixed term contracts, as here is where we find an effect. 
Figure A6 shows the results for cutoffs at 6 and 18 months. 
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Figure A6: Test for discontinuities at other cutoff points. 
 
Figure A6 shows no discontinuity at either of the two points. There appears to be a 
discontinuity at the 18-month cutoff, but that is only because the linear approximation to the 
left of the cutoff is an average between the trends pre- and post-12 months. If we look at the 
confidence intervals of the points around the 18-month cutoff, we see no statistically 
significant difference before and after the cutoff. 
 
4. Using different specifications: different bandwidths, including covariates, and 
clustering the standard errors. 
 
Lastly, we explore different specifications of the original estimations. First, we explore the use 
of different bandwidths used to construct the polynomial fits under the Epanechnikov kernel. 
We estimate the effect of having the right to access the solidarity fund for fixed term workers 
under two different choices of MSE-optimal bandwidth: one using the difference of regression 
estimates (the default) and one using the sum of the regression estimates. For both cases, 
we estimate the effects multiplying the bandwidth by a different factor, from 0.8 to 2.  Results, 
shown in table A1, show that effects remain statistically significant, although they do increase 
in size when the bandwidth increases. 
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Table A1: Treatment under different bandwidths and kernels (Entrants) 
  Triangular Kernel (Default) 
 
BW x 0.8 BW x 1 BW x 1.25 
  All 
Open 
ended 
Fixed 
term 
All 
Open 
ended 
Fixed 
term 
All 
Open 
ended 
Fixed 
term 
RD_Estimat
e 
1.320**
* 
1.547*** 1.169** 
1.497**
* 
1.468*** 1.487*** 
1.530**
* 
1.250*** 1.675*** 
 
(0.366) (0.574) (0.470) (0.333) (0.521) (0.428) (0.279) (0.436) (0.361) 
 
         
Observation
s 
123,567 25,698 97,869 123,567 25,698 97,869 123,567 25,698 97,869 
 
BW x 1.5 BW x 1.75 BW x 2 
  
All 
Open 
ended 
Fixed 
term 
All 
Open 
ended 
Fixed 
term 
All 
Open 
ended 
Fixed 
term 
RD_Estimat
e 
1.472**
* 
0.946** 1.760*** 
1.427**
* 
0.773** 1.776*** 
1.403**
* 
0.643** 1.773*** 
 
(0.246) (0.385) (0.319) (0.222) (0.349) (0.291) (0.205) (0.322) (0.270) 
 
         
Observation
s 
123,567 25,698 97,869 123,567 25,698 97,869 123,567 25,698 97,869 
  Epanechnikov Kernel 
 
BW x 0.8 BW x 1 BW x 1.25 
  All 
Open 
ended 
Fixed 
term 
All 
Open 
ended 
Fixed 
term 
All 
Open 
ended 
Fixed 
term 
RD Estimate 
1.343**
* 
1.483*** 1.247*** 
1.517**
* 
1.405*** 1.555*** 
1.521**
* 
1.161*** 1.714*** 
 
(0.354) (0.555) (0.455) (0.326) (0.512) (0.419) (0.271) (0.425) (0.351) 
 
         
Observation
s 
123,567 25,698 97,869 123,567 25,698 97,869 123,567 25,698 97,869 
 
BW x 1.5 BW x 1.75 BW x 2 
  
All 
Open 
ended 
Fixed 
term 
All 
Open 
ended 
Fixed 
term 
All 
Open 
ended 
Fixed 
term 
RD Estimate 
1.441**
* 
0.826** 1.777*** 
1.395**
* 
0.663* 1.780*** 
1.373**
* 
0.540* 1.766*** 
 
(0.238) (0.374) (0.310) (0.216) (0.339) (0.282) (0.199) (0.313) (0.263) 
 
         
Observation
s 
123,567 25,698 97,869 123,567 25,698 97,869 123,567 25,698 97,869 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A second difference in specification is the inclusion of covariates (Table A2). We estimate the 
effect including gender and schooling dummies, as well as the average income in the 
previous employment period. Results show that effect sizes go down, but remain significant 
in the conventional approach, but not in the bias-correct effect under robust standard errors. 
Table A2: Effects including covariates 
 
  All 
Open 
ended 
Fixed 
term 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
RD 
estimate 
1.258**
* 
1.521*** 1.127*** 
 
(0.314) (0.482) (0.411) 
    
        
Observatio
ns 
123,56
7 
25,698 97,869 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table A2: Effects including covariates 
  All 
Open 
ended 
Fixed 
term 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
RD 
estimate 
1.258**
* 
1.521*** 1.127*** 
 
(0.314) (0.482) (0.411) 
    
        
Observatio
ns 
123,56
7 
25,698 97,869 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The third difference in specification is to cluster the standard errors, thus allowing within-
cluster variance (table A3). We use three variables to cluster: the economic sector of the 
worker, the district (comuna) where the worker lives, and the cohort in which the work was 
born. Effects remain significant in all cases, although the effects under economic sector and 
birth cohort clusters show are statistically significant at a lower level. 
 
Table A3: Estimation with clustered standard errors. 
  Cluster: Economic sector Cluster: District Cluster: Birth cohort 
 
All 
Open 
ended 
Fixed 
term 
All Open ended 
Fixed 
term 
All 
Open 
ended 
Fixed 
term 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
RD 
estimate 
1.497**
* 
1.468*** 1.487*** 
1.497**
* 
1.468*** 1.487*** 
1.497**
* 
1.468** 1.487*** 
 
(0.385) (0.497) (0.519) (0.455) (0.486) (0.501) (0.491) (0.606) (0.527) 
 
         
Observatio
ns 
123,56
7 
25,698 97,869 
123,56
7 
25,698 97,869 
123,56
7 
25,698 97,869 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table A3: Estimation with clustered standard errors. 
  
Cluster: Economic 
sector 
Cluster: District Cluster: Birth cohort 
 
All 
Open 
ended 
Fixed 
term 
All 
Open 
ended 
Fixed 
term 
All 
Open 
ended 
Fixed 
term 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
RD 
estimate 
1.497**
* 
1.468**
* 
1.487**
* 
1.497**
* 
1.468**
* 
1.487**
* 
1.497**
* 
1.468** 
1.487**
* 
 
(0.385) (0.497) (0.519) (0.455) (0.486) (0.501) (0.491) (0.606) (0.527) 
 
         
Observatio
ns 
123,56
7 
25,698 97,869 
123,56
7 
25,698 97,869 
123,56
7 
25,698 97,869 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The role of informal employment during noncontribution periods 
We have no information on workers after their employment relationships end. This means 
that they could be working (informally, as formal self-employed, or in the public sector) during 
the noncontribution period, thus artificially increasing the duration of the period between 
formal private jobs. To address this issue, we re-estimate our main results with a subsample 
with shorter noncontribution duration periods. We look at workers with a noncontribution 
duration of at most 12, 6, and 3 months. Results are shown in table A4. 
 
Table A4: Effect of having a claim to the solidarity fund (for shorter nonemployment 
duration subsample) 
Maximum 12 months of noncontribution duration 
  All Contracts Open ended Fixed term 
 
All 
workers 
Entrants 
Non-
entrants 
All 
workers 
Entrants 
Non-
entrants 
All 
workers 
Entrants 
Non-
entrants 
RD 
Estimate 
0.0614** 0.762*** 0.0481* 0.0913 0.568** 0.0679 0.0531* 0.874*** 0.0427 
 
(0.0271) (0.187) -0.0274 (0.0647) (0.288) (0.0665) (0.0297) (0.244) (0.0299) 
            
Obs. 1,204,687 99,309 1,105,378 318,168 20,211 297,957 886,519 79,098 807,421 
Maximum 6 months of noncontribution duration 
  All Contracts Open ended Fixed term 
 
All 
workers 
Entrants 
Non-
entrants 
All 
workers 
Entrants 
Non-
entrants 
All 
workers 
Entrants 
Non-
entrants 
RD 
Estimate 
0.0388** 0.248** 0.0346** 0.0169 -0.0831 0.0240 0.0449** 0.444*** 0.0381** 
 
(0.0161) (0.103) (0.0163) (0.0379) (0.171) (0.0389) (0.0177) (0.126) (0.0179) 
            
Obs. 960,684 66,859 893,825 248,930 14,576 234,354 711,754 52,283 659,471 
Maximum 3 months of noncontribution duration 
  All Contracts Open ended Fixed term 
 
All 
workers 
Entrants 
Non-
entrants 
All 
workers 
Entrants 
Non-
entrants 
All 
workers 
Entrants 
Non-
entrants 
RD 
Estimate 
0.0162* 0.195*** 0.0109 0.00592 0.0944 0.000510 0.0191* 0.226*** 0.0139 
 
(0.00919) (0.0575) (0.00931) (0.0223) (0.0982) (0.0229) (0.0100) (0.0695) (0.0102) 
            
Obs. 716,428 46,283 670,145 172,231 9,582 162,649 544,197 36,701 507,496 
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Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions use 4 months for bandwidth. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A4 shows results to be consistent with previous estimates. When halving 
noncontribution durations (from 24 months in the paper to 12 months), effects are roughly 
halved. We get a similar trend when looking at 6 and 3 months. Effects are to a large extent 
explained by entrants with fixed term contracts. Even if informal work plays a role in 
extending the noncontribution durations, we find that the  results are consistent for shorter 
durations, where employment outside of the formal private job market is unlikely.  
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